AI Driven Nuclear Decision Making and Strategic Stability in South Asia
Keywords:
Artificial Intelligence, Nuclear Decision-Making, Strategic Stability, Nuclear Deterrence, Human–Machine TeamingAbstract
The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming the strategic landscape of international security, particularly in the fields of nuclear deterrence, military decision-making, and strategic stability. As AI-enabled technologies become increasingly integrated into intelligence analysis, early-warning systems, cyber operations, autonomous military platforms, and Nuclear Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (NC3) systems, they are fundamentally reshaping how nuclear-armed states perceive threats, process information, and respond during crises. Although considerable scholarly attention has focused on the implications of AI for major nuclear powers such as the United States, China, and Russia, comparatively little research has examined its impact on South Asia, a region characterized by enduring geopolitical rivalry, unresolved territorial disputes, recurring military crises, and compressed decision-making timelines. This study investigates the implications of AI-driven nuclear decision-making for strategic stability in South Asia by integrating classical deterrence theory with emerging perspectives on algorithmic governance, cyber deterrence, offense–defense dynamics, and human–machine interaction. Using a qualitative research design supported by comparative case analysis, the study evaluates AI's role in nuclear command, control, communications, and intelligence (NC3), autonomous military systems, predictive analytics, cyber-enabled escalation, and crisis decision-making. The findings indicate that AI constitutes a paradoxical strategic capability: while it enhances situational awareness, intelligence processing, and operational efficiency, it also generates significant risks through algorithmic opacity, automation bias, cyber vulnerabilities, and decision compression, thereby increasing the potential for inadvertent escalation. The study concludes that technological superiority alone cannot ensure strategic stability. Instead, preserving stability requires effective AI governance, strengthened cyber resilience, bilateral confidence-building measures, international regulatory cooperation, and the preservation of meaningful human control over nuclear decision-making to minimize the risks of accidental or unintended nuclear escalation in South Asia.
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